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Abstract: In this essay, I will bring several hitherto neglected sources, which pertain to Petrus 
van Musschenbroek’s (1692-1762) unpublished manuscripts, to the fore. The folios at hand 
show that Musschenbroek read and actively engaged with Spinoza’s (1632-1677) Ethica. 
More precisely, it will be shown that Musschenbroek held clear-cut anti-Spinozistic 
convictions. 
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I 
 
It is well documented that Petrus van Musschenbroek’s (1692-1761) colleague at the 
University of Leiden between 1740 and 1742, Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande (1688-1742), 
owned and commented upon Spinoza’s work. Both professors have been labelled 
‘Newtonians’ 1  and Newtonianism has in recent years been portrayed as an important 
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 I am thankful to the Special Collections Department at Leiden University Library and to the Boerhaave 
Museum for kind permission to quote from the material in their care. I am greatly indebted to the anonymous 
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1) See, for example, the following pivotal studies: P. Brunet, Les physiciens hollandais et la méthode 
expérimentale en France au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, 1926 and E.G. Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth-century Leiden: Philosophy and the New Science in the University, The Hague, 1973. 
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countermovement against different forms of Spinozism in the Dutch Republic.
2
 In this modest 
contribution, no claims will be made concerning the rapport between Newtonianism and anti-
Spinozism. Whereas, as I shall indicate in the next paragraph, we have a clear idea of the loci 
in ’s Gravesande’s corpus in which he mentioned Spinoza and dealt with his ideas, we are 
currently ignorant whether Musschenbroek indeed engaged with Spinoza’s ideas at all. The 
aim of this contribution is to document – by drawing attention to hitherto neglected evidence 
taken from his unpublished manuscripts – that he was indeed highly concerned with the 
philosophical views of Spinoza. Musschenbroek’s published work, it should be emphasised, 
contains no signs that he engaged with Spinoza’s work in a thorough manner. Close scrutiny 
of Musschenbroek’s published work shows that there in fact are only two passages in which 
he explicitly mentioned Spinoza’s name in passing: in his Oratio inauguralis de mente 
humana semet ignorante (1740) and eight years later in his Institutiones logicae (1748).
3
 
Here I shall show that in numerous places amongst his manuscripts, which still remain 
understudied,
4
 Musschenbroek vehemently criticised Spinoza’s philosophical system as early 
as 1725.
5
 In section IV, I draw attention to a several folios among his manuscripts, in which 
                                                          
2) See E. Jorink and H. Zuidervaart, ‘How Isaac Newton was Fashioned in the Netherlands’, in: E. Jorink 
and A. Maas, eds, Newton and the Netherlands, How Isaac Newton was Fashioned in the Dutch Republic, 
Amsterdam, 2012, pp. 13-65 and E. Jorink, ‘Honouring Sir Isaac, or, Exorcizing the Ghost of Spinoza: Some 
Remarks on the Success of Newton in the Dutch Republic’, in: S. Ducheyne, ed, Future Perspectives on Newton 
Scholarship and the Newtonian Legacy in Eighteenth-century Science and Philosophy, Brussels, 2009, pp. 23-43. 
3) As part of an exposition of several philosophical positions on the nature of the mind, Musschenbroek 
briefly mentioned Averroes and ‘the most unhappy character Spinoza [infelicissimique ingenii Spinoza]’ as 
scholars who believe that the mind is a mode of God (P. van Musschenbroek, Oratio inauguralis de mente 
humana semet ignorante, Lugduni Batavorum, Apud Samuelem Luchtmans, 1740, p. 6). In his textbook on logic, 
Musschenbroek briefly mentioned Spinoza’s position on universals (id., Institutiones logicae, Praecipue 
comprehendentes artem argumentandi, Lugduni Batavorum, Apud Samuelem Luchtmans et filium, 1748, p. 29). 
4) Leiden University bought Musschenbroek’s manuscripts from his relatives in 1826 (see [anon.], 
Bibliotheca Musschenbroekiana, sive catalogus librorum, Lugduni Batavorum, Per S. et L. Luchtmans, 1826). 
To this day, his manuscripts, which contain approximately 12,000 folios (C. de Pater, Petrus van Musschenbroek 
[1692-1761], Een newtoniaans natuuronderzoeker, PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 1979, pp. 361-365), are 
preserved in the Special Collections of Leiden University Library. 
5 ) For a detailed reassessment of Musschenbroek’s Newtonianism, see my currently unpublished 
manuscript, tentatively entitled ‘Petrus van Musschenbroek’s on Physica and Method, or Why Newtonianism 
abounds in Variety’. On ’s Gravesande’s ‘Newtonianism’, see S. Ducheyne, ‘W. J. ’s Gravesande’s 
Appropriation of Newton’s Natural Philosophy, Part I: Epistemological and Theological Issues’, Centaurus, vol. 
56:1, 2014, pp. 31-55 and id., ‘W. J. ‘s Gravesande’s Appropriation of Newton’s Natural Philosophy, Part II: 
Methodological Issues’, Centaurus, vol. 56:2, 2014, pp. 97-120. 
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he attacked specific doctrines of Spinoza’s system in considerable detail. At the end of this 
contribution, the readers will be provided with a complete transcription of this important 
source. In section III, I will give a brief overview of other loci in Musschenbroek’s 
manuscripts in which he dealt with Spinoza. Before I do so, I will briefly touch upon ’s 
Gravesande’s anti-Spinozism, which is relevant to contextualise Musschenbroek’s. 
 
II 
 
’s Gravesande’s private library, which was auctioned in the year of his death, contained a 
copy of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670) and a copy of his Opera posthuma 
(1677).
6
 Elsewhere, I have documented ’s Gravesande’s negative attitude towards Spinoza’s 
philosophical system and I need not to repeat the details here.
7
 In several chapters in his 
Introductio ad philosophiam
 
(1736), he openly castigated the unwelcome implications of 
Spinoza’s ideas for human freedom.8 In the chapters referred to, ’s Gravesande argued against 
Spinoza that not all human actions are determined by mechanical causes or, in other words, by 
absolute or ‘fatal’ necessity.9 In certain circumstances, humans are able make decisions based 
on rational deliberation and, when they do, they are genuinely free, according to ’s 
Gravesande. In a similar vein, in a posthumously published manuscript, entitled Essais de 
métaphysique, which was intended for ‘a small number of persons [un petit nombre de 
personnes],’10 ’s Gravesande argued, as opposed to Proposition 33, Part I, of Spinoza’s Ethica, 
which states that ‘[t]hings could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other 
order than they have been produced’,11 that God is bounded, not by absolute necessity, but by 
                                                          
6 ) [anon.], Bibliotheca ’sGravesandiana, sive catalogus librorum bibliothecae selectissimae viri 
clarissimi D. Gul. Jac. ’s Gravesande, Lugduni Batavorum, Apud Joh. & Herm. Verbeek, 1742, p. 101. 
7) Ducheyne, ‘W. J. ’s Gravesande’s Appropriation of Newton’s Natural Philosophy, Part I’ (as in n. 5), 
pp. 44-46. 
8) W.J. ’s Gravesande, Introductio ad philosophia, metaphysicam et logicam continens, Leidae, Apud 
Johannem et Herman Verbeek, 1736, pp. 42-63, esp. pp. 51-52. 
9) On fatal necessity, see Leiden University Library, Special Collections, Bibliotheca Publica Latina, 
codex 240 (hereafter: BPL 240), no. 24, fol. 70
r
 and fol. 180
r
. 
10) J.-N.-S. Allamand, ed, Oeuvres philosophiques et mathématiques de Mr. G. J. ‘s Gravesande, 2 vols, 
Amsterdam, Marc Michel Rey, 1774 [1744], vol. 1, p. 173. 
11) E.M. Curley, ed., The Collected Writings of Spinoza, Volume I, Princeton, 1985, p. 436. 
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moral necessity – a view which is very much in line with Samuel Clarke’s A Demonstration 
of the Being and Attributes of God (1705), which he owned.
12
 
Is there any historical evidence that Musschenbroek ever read Spinoza? To this day, this 
has remained a matter of mere speculation. The auction catalogue of Musschenbroek’s library, 
for instance, does not contain a single work by Spinoza.
13
 Musschenbroek’s self-compiled 
‘Catalogus librorum meorum ao 1720’ contains, as I was able to determine recently, the entry 
‘Spinoza in philosophiam Cartesii’, 14  which refers to Spinoza’s Renati Des Cartes 
Principiorum philosophiae pars I et II (1663),
15
 but what we really want to know is whether 
Musschenbroek ever read Spinoza’s Ethica or his Tractatus theologico-politicus.  
As will be shown below, there is ample evidence that Musschenbroek read and even 
reacted to Spinoza’s Ethica. In what follows, I shall document three sorts of contexts in which 
Musschenbroek discussed Spinoza’s Ethica: namely, when discussing the latter’s views on 
human liberty, his idea of God, and his philosophical system as a whole. 
 
III 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the earliest datable source in which Musschenbroek refers to 
Spinoza occurs in the manuscript ‘Praelectiones de Deo ejusque attributis’ which contains a 
series of lectures ‘held in the year 1725 [habitae A° 1725]’.16 Spinoza is mentioned – together 
with Thomas Hobbes – at the beginning of the manuscript as an atheist ‘who cultivates reason 
and believes by the force of his arguments that there probably is no God [qui rationem excolit, 
et credit ex viribus suorum argumentorum probabiliter esse ↓fluere↓ non dari Deum]’.17 The 
second chapter of this manuscript, entitled ‘Caput secundum de Existentia Dei’, contains 
                                                          
12) S. Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: More Particularly in Answer to Mr. 
Hobbs, Spinoza, and Their Followers, Wherein the Notion of Liberty is Stated, and the Possibility and Certainty 
of it Proved, In Opposition to Necessity and Fate, London, W. Botham, for J. Knapton, 1705, esp. pp. 236-237; 
[anon.], Bibliotheca ‘sGravesandiana (as in n. 6), p. 52, item n° 117. 
13) [anon.], Bibliotheca Musschenbroekiana (as in note 4). 
14) Leiden, Boerhaave Museum, Archives ms. a 138.d, fol. 37
v
. 
15) B. de Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum philosophiae pars I et II, Amstelodami, Apud 
Johannem Riewerts, 1663. 
16) BPL 240 (as in n. 9), no. 12, fols 1
r
-118
v
. Musschenbroek was appointed at the University of Utrecht 
between 1723 and 1739. 
17) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 2
r
, cf. fol. 2
v. Spinoza is briefly mentioned again on Musschenbroek’s ‘Praelectiones 
de Deo ejusque attributis’ on fol. 15r-v. 
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Musschenbroek’s most detailed attack against Spinoza’s philosophy.18 This material will be 
analysed separately in the following section. 
In a lengthy manuscript entitled ‘Ad S Gravesandii Introductionem in Philosophiam 
notae’, which is to be found in Leiden University Library, Special Collections, 19 
Musschenbroek took extensive notes on ’s Gravesande’s Introductio ad philosophiam 
(1736).
20
 In these notes, which were composed at some point after 1736, Musschenbroek 
sided with many of the criticisms that ’s Gravesande had raised against Spinoza in his 
Introductio ad philosophiam. Not surprisingly, Musschenbroek’s notes contain a sustained 
attack, that was inspired by ’s Gravesande’s views on the matter, on what he saw as the 
absurdities of Spinoza’s denial of human freedom. Like ’s Gravesande, Musschenbroek was 
convinced that a ‘sane human individual [homo sanae mentis]’21 is free in the sense that he is 
capable to determine his actions by his own will and that his actions are not determined by 
external causes. In those cases, he is not determined ‘by a blind external cause [non â causa 
caeca externa]’, but by his own reason. 22  By contrast, Spinoza was convinced, 
Musschenbroek explained, that human actions are determined by external, corporeal causes 
only and that, accordingly, their actions are determined by fatal necessity.
23
 In this context, 
Musschenbroek cited from Spinoza’s famous letter on freedom and necessity,24 just as ’s 
                                                          
18) This particular chapter is to be found on ibid., no. 12, fols 30
r
-53
v. The first chapter, ‘Caput primum 
de Idea Dei’, is to be found on ibid., no. 12, fols 7v-29v, the third, ‘Caput Tertium De Attributis Divinis’, on ibid., 
no. 12, fols 54
r
-64
r
, and the fourth untitled chapter on ibid., no. 12, fols 65
r
-73
r
. These numbered chapters are 
followed by several unnumbered chapters, to wit ‘De Deo Aeterno’ (ibid., no. 12, fols 73v-81r), ‘De 
Omnipraesentia Divina’ (ibid., no. 12, fols 81v-93v), ‘De Deo Immenso’ (ibid., no. 12, fols 94r-97r), ‘De Deo 
Infinito’ (ibid., no. 12, fols 97v-105r), ‘De Deo Unico’ (ibid., no. 12, fols 106r-113r), and ‘De Deo Simplici’ (ibid., 
no. 12, fols 113
v
-116
r
). 
19) Ibid., no. 24, ff. 1
r
-446
r
 and ibid., no. 12, fols 117
r
-267
r
. 
20) On ibid., no. 24, fols 1
r
-446
r
 Musschenbroek commented extensively on Book I, Parts I and II of ’s 
Gravesande’s Introductio ad philosophiam (’s Gravesande,  Introductio ad philosophiam (as in n. 8), pp. 1-101) 
and on ibid., no. 12, fols 117
r
-267
r
 he commented on Book II, Parts I and II (’s Gravesande,  Introductio ad 
philosophiam, pp. 102-257). 
21) BPL 240, no. 24, fol. 180
r
. 
22) Ibid., , no. 24, fol. 179
v
. 
23) Ibid., , no. 24, fols 221
r
-225
r
, fol. 180
v
. 
24) B. d. S., Opera posthuma, s.l., s.n., pp. 583-586. More specifically, Musschenbroek offers the words 
‘Humana libertas, quam omnes se habere jactant, in eo solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitus sint conscii, 
sed causarum, â quibus determinantur ignari.’ (BPL 240, no. 24, fol. 222v) as a quotation of ‘Atque haec humana 
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Gravesande had done,
25
 and from Proposition 48, Part II, of Spinoza’s Ethica, which states 
that ‘[i]n the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined to will this or 
that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to 
infinity’,26 to substantiate his claim.27 According to Musschenbroek, Spinoza’s doctrine of fate 
‘absolutely leads to atheism [absolute ducit ad atheismum]’28 and subverts the very idea that 
humans are morally accountable for their actions.
29
 
At another occasion in the same manuscript, when commenting upon Part II of Book II 
of ’s Gravesande’s  Introductio ad philosophiam, i.e. ‘De Causis Errorum’,30 Musschenbroek 
took issue with Spinoza’s idea of God. Musschenbroek noted that it is a common strategy 
amongst heretics to use the word ‘God’ in a sense which differs from its proper meaning. 
‘Some heretics’, he elaborated, ‘practiced crafts of this kind under the appearance and veil of 
piety, as Spinoza and chiefly Pontianus van Hattem
31
 and others have done [quales artes 
nonnulli haeretici sub facie ↓& velo↓ pietatis exercent, ita Spinoza, & ↓praecipue↓ Pontianus 
van Hattem, aliique fecerunt]’.32 Musschenbroek contrasted what he considered to be the 
proper idea of God, namely ‘an incorporeal, eternal being which is endowed with an infinite 
intelligence and operating power and which depends on no other being [Ens incorporeum, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
illa libertas est, quam omnes habere jactant, & quae in hoc solo consistit, quòd homines sui appetitûs sint conscii, 
& causarum, à quibus determinantur, ignari.’ (B. d. S., Opera posthuma, p. 585). 
25) ’s Gravesande, Introductio ad philosophiam, pp. 51-52. 
26) Curley, The Collected Writings of Spinoza, Volume I (as in n. 11), p. 483. 
27) B. d. S., Opera posthuma (as in n. 24), p. 85: ‘In Mente nulla est absoluta, sive libera voluntas; sed 
Mens ad hoc, vel illud volendum determinatur à causâ, quae etiam ab aliâ determinata est, & haec iterum ab 
aliâ, & sic in infinitum.’ On BPL 240, no. 24, fol. 221r, Musschenbroek quotes the above proposition as follows: 
‘In mente nulla est absoluta seu Libera voluntas, sed Mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur â causâ, quae 
etiam ab aliâ determinata est, & haec iterum ab aliâ, & sic in infinitum.’ The same proposition is also referred to 
on ibid., fol. 180
v
. 
28) BPL 240, no. 24, fol. 272
v
. 
29) Ibid., , no. 24, fol. 180
v
 and fol. 224
r-v
. 
30) ’s Gravesande,  Introductio ad philosophiam, pp. 223-257. 
31) On the preacher from St. Philipsland, Pontiaan van Hattem (1641?-1706), who was accused of 
holding heretical views, which were associated with the teachings of Spinoza, see P.C. Molhuysen and P.J. Blok, 
Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, 10 vols, Leiden, 1911-1937, vol. 4, pp. 727-728 and A. 
Roothaan, ‘Pontiaan van Hattem: Een vroege kentheoretische criticus van Spinoza’, Tijdschrift voor filosofie, vol. 
50:3, 1988, pp. 525-535. For van Hattem and Hattemism more generally, see M. Wielema, The March of the 
Libertines, Spinozists and the Dutch Reformed Church (1660-1750), Hilversum, 2004, Chapter 6. 
32) BPL 240, no. 12, fol. 256
r
. 
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↓aeternum,↓ infinita intelligentia et potentia operante praeditum â nullo alio Ente 
dependens]’,33 with Spinoza’s misguided idea of God ‘by which God is understood to be an 
absolutely infinite being or substance which consists of an infinity of attributes [per Deum 
intelligere Ens absolute infinitum, sive substantiam ex infinitis attributis constantem]’. On 
Spinoza’s understanding of ‘God’, Musschenbroek pointed out, ‘God and the world are one 
and the same [Deus & mundus ipsi sint ↓unum &↓ idem]’.34 
 
 IV 
 
In the second chapter of his ‘Praelectiones de Deo ejusque attributis’ (1725) – namely, on 
folios 49
r
 to 52
v
, which are transcribed in their entirety in the appendix to this contribution – 
Musschenbroek commented upon Spinoza’s Ethica. These folios contain Musschenbroek’s 
most detailed criticism of Spinoza’s ideas. Although his notes are oftentimes redundant, they 
provide us with valuable insight into those aspects of Spinoza’s thought which 
Musschenbroek found theologically unacceptable. As will be shown, in order to pinpoint 
several differences of opinion Musschenbroek referred to specific loci in Spinoza’s Ethica. 
At the outset of his notes on Spinoza (and, to some extent, on John Toland), 
Musschenbroek reported on the atheistic conviction that ‘motion is originally something  
necessary of all matter [motum in genere omnis materiae esse necessarium]’. The idea of 
motion being inherently essential to matter is inconsistent with the idea that there is ‘some 
matter at rest [aliquam materiam quiescentem]’, Musschenbroek pointed out.35 ‘Nevertheless’, 
he continued, ‘an author of this century, John Toland, has endeavoured to show, in his Third 
Letter,
36
 that motion or endeavour to motion is essential to matter [Hujus tamen saeculi autor 
Tolandus Litt: 3. conatus fuit demonstrare, motum vel conatum ad motum, esse essentialem 
mater{i}ei]’.37 ‘From matter alone’, however, ‘nothing will ever be brought about [ex sola 
mate{ri}a nihil unquam fiet]’, Musschenbroek pointed out. He, furthermore, raised the issue 
                                                          
33) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 256
v
. 
34) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 257
r
. 
35) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 49
r
. 
36) Musschenbroek’s reference is to John Toland, Letters to Serena, London, Bernard Lintot, 1704. 
However, the reference to Letter III is mistaken. Given the contents of Letters to Serena, it was probably 
Musschenbroek’s intention to refer to the content of Letter IV (ibid., esp. pp. 158-61) and Letter V, which is 
entitled ‘Motion essential to Matter; in Answer to some Remarks by an noble Friend on the Confutation of 
Spinosa’ (ibid., p. 163). 
37) BPL 240, no. 12, fol. 49
r
. 
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of whether, given the atheistic supposition of the (absolute) necessity of matter, ‘the force of 
gravity is included in matter <as one of its essential, i.e. universal properties> or not [an 
mater{iae} inclusa est potentia gravitatis vel non]’. If it is not, he argued, then, given the 
materialistic ontology proposed by Toland, ‘in a world that is merely corporeal, in which 
there is no Intelligent Being, no motion will originate [tum in mundo mere corporeo, in quo 
nullum Ens adest Intelligens, nullus oriri poterit motus]’. If gravity is claimed to be a 
‘universal property of matter [proprietas Universalis materiae]’, then this conflicts with the 
fact that there is a vacuum, because the notion of a vacuum implies, as Musschenbroek argued, 
that matter – and the properties which are deemed essential to it (including, ex suppositione, 
gravity) – can be absent from parts in space, which entails, as he pointed out quickly, that 
matter is, contrary to the atheist’s supposition, not ‘absolutely necessary [absolute necessaria]’ 
and that gravity cannot be claimed to be a truly universal or – which was the same for him – 
essential property of matter. 
In the remaining paragraphs, Musschenbroek turned his attention to Spinoza, to whom 
he referred as ‘the most famous patron of atheism of the preceding century [celeberrimus 
Atheismi patronus praecedentis saeculi]’. In his Ethica Spinoza endorsed the view that ‘the 
entire world and its parts exist <absolutely> necessarily [totum mundum, omnesque ejus 
partes existere necessario]’, Musschenbroek explained.38 In order to illustrate Spinoza’s views, 
he cited from the following statements from Part I of Spinoza’s Ethica: namely, Proposition 6, 
which states that ‘[o]ne substance cannot be produced by another substance39 [Una substantia 
non potest produci ab alia substantia]’, Proposition 7, which states that ‘[i]t pertains to the 
nature of a substance to exist
40
 [ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere]’, Proposition 8, 
which states that ‘[e]very substance is necessarily infinite41 [Omnis substantia est necessario 
infinita]’, and Proposition 14, which states that ‘[e]xcept God, no substance can be or be 
conceived [Praeter Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest substantia]’.42 Moreover, Spinoza, 
Musschenbroek continued on f. 50
v
, describes things ‘with ambiguous expressions [ambiguis 
expressionibus]’. For instance, ‘he first audaciously posits that every substance is necessary 
and afterwards he tries to reject this [primo audacter ponit Omnem Substantiam esse 
necessariam; et postea hoc rejicere tentat]’, although in Proposition 33 [Part I] he says that 
                                                          
38) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 49
v
. 
39) Curley, The Collected Writings of Spinoza, Volume I, p. 411. 
40) Ibid. 
41) Ibid, p. 412. 
42) Ibid., p. 420; BPL 240, no. 12, fol. 50
v
. 
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‘[t]hings could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they 
have been produced’43 and in Proposition 16 that ‘[f]rom the necessity of the divine nature 
there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can 
fall under an infinite intellect.)’.44 Musschenbroek also argued that the necessity by which 
God has created the world and the things contained in it is not determined ‘by a natural <i.e. 
fatal> necessity without will and deliberation [a naturali necessitate, absque voluntate et 
arbitrio]’, as posited by Spinoza, but ‘by a necessity of Wisdom and Goodness [a necessitate 
Sapientiae et Bonitatis]’, i.e. by what Clarke and ’s Gravesande have called ‘moral 
necessity’.45 In this context, Musschenbroek quoted from Corollary 1 to Proposition 32, Part I, 
which states that ‘God does not produce any effect by freedom of the will46 [Deum non 
operari ex Libertate voluntatis],’ and he also referred to the Scholium to Proposition 17, Part 
I
47
, in which Spinoza made related claims.
48
 According to Musschenbroek, Spinoza’s view 
that there is but one eternal and absolutely necessary substance leads to several absurdities. 
First, that it will be a contradiction ‘to conceive of more <than one substance> or that there 
are substances <other than God> [plures concipere aut esse substantias]’.49 Second, that it is 
contradictory to conceive of the world ‘in a different order [in alio ordine]’ than the present 
one. Moreover, if motion is essential to matter, then either it is a contradiction to suppose that 
matter is at rest or motion is to be considered as ‘something which is eternally communicated 
from one body to another without any original cause [rem […] ab aeterno communicatam ab 
uno corpore in aliud, absque ulla causa originali]’.50 These two absurdities, Musschenbroek 
underscored, are implied in Lemma 3, Proposition 13, Part II of Spinoza’s Ethica, which 
states that ‘[a] body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another 
body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, 
and so on, to infinity
51
 [corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari 
debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio, et illud 
iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum].’ The world has been created by God and ‘only God is the 
                                                          
43) Curley, The Collected Writings of Spinoza, Volume I, p. 436. 
44) Ibid., p. 424. 
45) BPL 240, no. 12, fol. 51
r
. 
46) Curley, The Collected Writings of Spinoza, Volume I, p. 435. 
47) Ibid., pp. 425-428.  
48) BPL 240, no. 12, fol. 51
v
. 
49) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 52
r
. 
50) Ibid., no. 12, fol. 52
r-v
. 
51) Curley, The Collected Writings of Spinoza, Volume I, p. 459. 
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eternal cause without beginning and end, because He carries in him all perfections and He is 
never bigger or smaller, but always the same without any shade of change,
52
 as it is 
excellently expressed in the Sacred (Scriptures) [solus Deus est causa Aeterna absque origine 
et fine, quia capit omnes perfectiones in se, et nunquam major, minorve est, sed semper idem 
absque ulla umbra mutationis, uti optime in Sacris expressum].’ 53 
 
V 
 
In view of the above analysis, it can no longer be doubted that Musschenbroek read Spinoza’s 
writings. We have seen that he was in fact highly familiar with the contents of Spinoza’s 
Ethica, which he ardently criticised in his unpublished manuscripts. In these manuscripts, 
Musschenbroek drew attention to what he considered as theologically unacceptable 
implications of the following loci in Spinoza’s Ethica: to wit, Propositions 6-8, Proposition 14, 
Proposition 16, the Scholium to Proposition 17, Corollary 1 to Proposition 32, Proposition 33, 
Part I, and Lemma 3 to Proposition 13 and Proposition 48, Part II. From what has been 
surveyed above, it is now clear that Musschenbroek fiercely opposed, on the one hand, 
Spinoza’s metaphysical necessitarianism, which rendered the very notion of human or divine 
freedom of will obsolete, and, on the other hand, his views on matter and motion, which 
entailed that the world is eternal and causally independent from a divine cause. It should by 
now be clear that, like ’s Gravesande, Musschenbroek held clear anti-Spinozistic convictions. 
  
                                                          
52) This might very well be a reference to James 1:17, which in the King James version reads: ‘Every 
good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no 
variableness, neither shadow of turning.’ (R. Carroll and S. Prickett, eds, The Bible, Authorized King James 
Version, Oxford, 1997, p. 281 [italics added]). 
53) BPL 240, no. 12, fol. 52
v
. 
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Appendix: Transcription of BPL 240, no. 12, ff. 49
r
-52
v
 
  
[f. 49
r
] Si Atheus dicit motum in genere omnis 
materiae esse necessarium, tum sequit{ur} 
debere esse contradictionem in terminis 
supponere aliquam materiam quies- 
centem, quod est adeo absurdum, ut 
à nemine supponi possit. 
Hujus tamen saeculi autor Tolandus 
Litt: 3. conatus fuit demonstrare, motum 
vel conatum ad motum, esse essentialem 
mater{ie}i, sed quam philosophicè, ex 
hâc sola consideratione patebit. 
Essentialis conatus ad motum cujusvis 
particul{ae} in hoc pleno
54
, debet esse vel 
juxta unam aliquam determinationem, 
vel versus omnem determinationem. 
Conatus ad motum versus unam deter- 
minationem non potest esse essentialis 
corpusculo, sed debet oriri exquadam 
externa causâ; quoniam nihil est 
in supposita necessaria natura alicujus 
corpusculi, ad ejus motum magis versus 
hanc, quam versus aliam determina- 
tionem disponendum: sed conatus 
ad motum versus omnem determi- 
nationem, est absoluta contradictio, 
vel posset modo aeternam quietem 
producere in corpusculo. 
 
 
 
                                                          
54) Note that Toland endorsed a plenum (Toland, Letters to Serena (as in n. 36), p. 159, pp. 172-173). 
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[f. 49
v
] Si vero atheus supponit motum esse neces- 
sarium et Essentialem aliquibus corpo- 
ribus, non vero omnibus; sequetur idem 
absurdum circa determinationem motus<.> 
Sed praeterea tum supponit absolutam 
aliquam necessitatem, et quae non 
esset Universalis, quod est magis absurd{um}. 
Sed ad ultimum {casum} veniamus 
in quo sola materia ponatur necessa- 
ria; tum vero {quaeram} ubi manet 
motus. nam ex sola materia nihil 
unquam fiet: praeterea, an mater{iae} 
inclusa est potentia gravitatis vel 
non: Si non, tum in mundo mere 
corporeo, in quo nullum Ens adest 
Intelligens, nullus oriri poterit 
motus; quoniam motus, ut supra 
ostensum est, non est absolute per 
se necessarius. Sed si gravitas sit 
inclusa necessari{ae} existenti{ae} corporu{m} 
tum erit inclusa in necessaria exis- 
tentia omnis materiae, vel alicujus 
materiae (verum idea gravitatis potest 
separari ab idea corporis, et corpus 
concipi absque gravitate)<.> Si quoque 
sit gravitas modo in aliqua materia 
et non in omni, tum materia non 
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[f. 50
r
] est res homogenenea, adeoque ñ
55
 absolute 
necessaria: nam in re absolute neces- 
saria non potest esse varietas, neque 
aliqui<s>
56
 gradus. Sed si gravitas sit 
proprietas Universalis materiae, tum 
datur vacuum, et quando datur vacuum, 
materia non est absolute necessaria, 
tum ë
57
 fieri potest ut materia non 
sit in spatio: Si nunc Atheus vult 
affirmare, materiam quidem esse 
necessariam, sed non adeo necessariam, 
ut repleat omnia spatia; tum dico 
illum ponere absolutam contradic- 
tionem; nam absoluta necessitas, 
est absoluta necessitas sibi similis 
in omni spatio et loco: et si non sit 
impossibile, ut materia absit ex 
certo spatio, etiam non est absolut{a} 
necessitas ut adsit materia alteri 
loco: vel non {r}equirit{ur} ut sit in omni 
loco. 
Spinoza, celeberrimus Atheismi patronus 
praecedentis saeculi, credidit nullam 
esse substantiarum diversitatem; 
sed totum mundum, omnesque ejus partes 
existere necessario: dicit enim in Ethic: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55) This is an abbreviation for ‘non’. 
56) In combination with ‘gradus’, the nominative ‘aliquis’ makes more sense than the dative ‘alicui’. 
57) This is probably an abbreviation for ‘enim’. 
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[f. 50
v
] part: i. prop: 6
58
. Una substantia non 
potest produci ab alia substantia 
et prop: 8
59
. Omnis substantia est necessa- 
rio infinita. et propos: 7
60
 ad na- 
turam substantiae pertinet existere. 
hic idem philosophus asseruit non 
esse alium Deum, praeter hoc Univer- 
sum: nam in prop: i4
61
 haec habet. 
Praeter Deum nulla dari, neque 
concipi potest substantia. 
Sed quaecunque sic proponit, ambiguis 
expressionibus describit in sequentis 
propositionibus, ut eludere argumenta 
eorum posset, quos in se invecturos 
praevidebat. Nam primo audacter 
ponit Omnem Substantiam esse 
necessariam; et postea hoc rejicere 
tentat; quamvis prop: 33
62
 dicat 
Res nullo alio modo, neque ordine à 
Deo produci potuerunt, quam pro- 
ductae sunt: et in prop: i6
63
: Ex neces- 
sitate divinae naturae, infinita infini- 
tis modis; hoc est omnia, quae sub 
intellectum infinitum cadere possunt 
sequi debent. 
 
                                                          
58) The original reads: ‘Una Substantia non potest produci ab aliâ substantiâ.’ (B. d. S., Opera posthuma, 
p. 4).  
59) The original reads: ‘Omnis substantia est necessariò infinita.’ (ibid., p. 5). 
60) The original reads: ‘Ad naturam substantiae pertinent existere.’ (ibid.). 
61) The original reads: ‘Praeter Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest substantia.’ (ibid., p. 12). 
62) The original reads: ‘Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine à Deo produci potuerunt, quàm productae 
sunt.’ (ibid., p. 29). 
63) The original reads: ‘Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub 
intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.’ (ibid., p. 16). 
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[f. 51
r
] Si incautus Lector hic crederet, Spino- 
zam arbitrari res esse necessarias eo statu 
{ac} sunt, quoniam Infinita Sapientia et 
Bonitas nunquam posset ponere res 
nisi in uno Optimo et Sapientissimo ordine, 
tum Lector deciperetur: nam talis ne- 
cessitas non est naturalis, sed tantum 
moralis & consequens necessitas, et hinc 
directe opposita necessitati illi à 
Spinozâ posit{ae}. Praeterea si Lector 
iis verbis intelligat, Deum fuisse deter- 
minatum, non a necessitate Sapientiae 
et Bonitatis, sed a naturali necessitate, 
absque voluntate et arbitrio, ut faceret 
omnes res ita, prout nunc sunt; tum 
etiam sensum Spinozae non intelligeret. 
quia in his duabus explicationibus Deum 
intelligimus velut distinctum à ma- 
teria, et ex quo materia; quod Spinoza 
negat, dicendo, esse unam modo substan- 
tiam. Et si quis crederet, omnes sub- 
stantias, quae sunt in hoc Universo, esse 
tantum modificationes divinae Essentiae, 
nondum sensum Spinozae caperet: nam 
tum Deus adhuc supponi posset instar 
agentis, operantis in se, et manifestan- 
tis se diversis modis, prout ipse vellet, 
et hoc absolute negat Spinoza; nam 
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[f. 51
v
] dicit prop: 32. Corol: i
64
 et in Schol: ad prop: i7
65
. 
Deum non operari ex Libertate voluntatis. 
adeoque sensus Spinozae, loquentis admodum 
obscure et ambigue; hic erit: Quia est absolute 
impossibile ut aliquid sit creatum vel pro- 
ductum ex alio; est absolute etiam impossi- 
bile Deum potuisse producere aliquid 
diversum ab eo quod nunc est; et ideo quod- 
cunque existit, debet esse talis pars divinae 
substantiae, non veluti modificatio facta 
in eâdem per aliquam voluntatem vel 
arbitrium, vel sapientiam in eo; sed veluti 
absoluta necessitas in se ipsa, cum respec- 
tu ad modum existentiae cujusvis partis 
non minus, quam cum respectu Existen- 
tiae existentiae <sic>, omnium rerum.  
Audite enim propositiones Spinozae<.> 
hae confirmabunt haec omnia dicta. 
prop: 6. Una Substantia non potest produci 
ab aliâ substantia. 
prop: 33. Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine 
à Deo produci potuerunt, quam productae 
sunt. 
prop: 14 Praeter Deum nulla dari neque 
concipi potest Substantia<.> 
prop: 32 corol: i Deum non operari ex 
Libertate voluntatis. 
Adeoque tota Spinozae opinio manifeste 
h{o}c sonat modo: mundum corporeum 
et quamlibet in eo partem, simul cum 
 
                                                          
64) The original reads: ‘Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.’ (ibid., p. 29). 
65) The scholium to Proposition 17, Part I, is to be found on ibid., pp. 17-19. 
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[f. 52
r
] ordine & modo existentiae cujusvis partis, 
esse existentiam à se, sive Existentiam 
necessariam: Haec autem opinio tam 
multa absurda in se continet, quam 
ulla unquam: Si enim una substantia 
modo sit absolute necessaria; ergo erit 
contradictio plures concipere aut esse sub- 
stantias; |{ec}quis vero vestrum invenit 
in se hanc contradictionem dum concipit, 
non est contradictio si concepta Linea 
mathematica, superficies, surdesolidum,
66
 
quadrato quadratum
67
 existeret, posset 
enim; sed actu existunt praeter Deum, 
corpora, spiritus, motus, ideae rerum, 
spatia, quae sunt diversissimae substantiae.|
68
 
Praeterea deberet esse contradictio con- 
cipere res hujus mundi in alio ordine 
quam nunc sunt, vel concipere plures 
homines, plantas, animalia, aut pauc{iores}, 
vel in aliis locis ac nunc sunt; ubi 
profecto nulla contradictio inest. 
{C}ogitur tertio, motum esse necessario 
à se supponere: adeoque erit mera con- 
tradictio in terminis supponere materiam 
esse in quiete: vel debet affirmare 
illud absurdissimum; motum esse rem 
dependentem, ab aeterno communicatam 
ab uno corpore in aliud, absque ulla causa 
 
 
                                                          
66) I.e., the fifth power of a number. 
67) I.e., the fourth power of a number. 
68) The abstruse syntax of the text between vertical lines makes it hard to understand its exact meaning. 
Here I will refrain from speculating on the matter.  
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[f. 52
v
] originali vel in se vel extra se: et hanc 
absurditatem videtur fuisse amplex{us} in 
parte 2. prop: i3. Lemma 3
69
. quando dicit 
corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum 
vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio 
corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem 
determinari debuit ab alio, et illud 
iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum. 
Quod profecto est tam absurdum, ut 
se ipsum refutet; nam fieri nequit, 
ut quod nunc finitum est, unquam 
sit vel fuerit absolute Infinitum, 
sed semper ad primum {a}liquod recur- 
rit, in quo definit necessario: et an 
ex his verbis non manifesto sequit{ur} 
motum poni ortum ex se ipso? cum 
igitur vidimus totum hoc universum 
non posse esse ab Aeterno, restat id 
tantum, ut sit à Deo, à causâ prima 
creante illum, cum omnibus quae 
sunt in Mundo: et qui solus Deus 
est causa Aeterna absque origine et 
fine, quia capit omnes perfectiones 
in se, et nunquam major, minorve 
est, sed semper idem absque ulla umbra 
mutationis, uti optime in Sacris 
expressum de Deo. 
                                                          
69) The original reads: ‘Corpus motum, vel quiescens ad motum, vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio 
corpore, quod etiam ad motum, vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterùm ab alio, & sic in infinitum.’ 
(B. d. S., Opera posthuma, p. 54). 
